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ABSTRACT 
Sluggisli price adj~istii~eilts  with respect to excliaiige rate shoclts talte esseiltially 
two forilis. Firstly, prices do not adjust coinpletely to neutralize  tlie  effects of 
noiiiii~al  exchange rate sliocks. Secondiy, price adjustiiients after exchange rate 
slioclts only take place i11  discrete time intervals,  in other words thcy are dis- 
continuous. These two featmes of price adjustinents fonn our definition of inter- 
iiatioiiai pi%  rigidities. In this papel- bve sliall prcsent a survey of tlic empirica1 
and theoretica1 literahlre on international price rigidities. We provide tlie uilder- 
lyii~g  intuitioii of the tlieoretical  research and present  a brief  summary of the 
einpirical findings. I. KNTRODUCTION 
111  the  inteillational  monetary  econoinics  literahlre,  there  exists  a 
long-staildiilg debate as coilceills the effectiveness  of tlie exchange 
rate instruinent to coi-rect for c~irrent  account iinbalances and stabili- 
satioil  purposes.  Conventional wisdoin  regardiilg  the  ileutrality  of 
excliailge rate policies is ilot justified by the empirical regularities. A 
coininon observation is that noiniilal excliaiige rates are much more 
volatile  in coi11parison to aggregate or firm level prices in ai1 ecoii- 
oiny providiilg scope for effective use of exchange rates as inonetary 
policy tools. 
There  are four veiy  closely related concepts  in  the  haildboolc  of 
exchange rates aild prices: The law of one price, the purchasing power 
parity, tlle exchange rate pass-through aiid the pricii~g-to-n~arltet'. 
The law of oile price (LOP) iinplies ai1 identical price of ai1 ideiiti- 
cal product across couiltries in the absence of distribution -,  resale -, 
transaction -  or traiisportatioil costs. Iii this outset the exchange rate 
is the siinple conversion operator. The LOP is coinmonly accepted as 
the touchstone  for the degree of marltet integration  of a particular 
prod~ict.  If the LOP can be extended to n- goods in ecoiioinies eiigag- 
mg iii trade we can conveniently refer to the purchasing power parity 
(PPP).  There  is  exteiisive  empirica1  evideilce  tliat  exchaiige  rate 
changes are not necessarily followed by price adjustinents to restore 
PPP and often it recluires long tiine periods for PPP to be inet again. 
If  the  noiniilal  exchange  rate  changes  have  real  effects  o11  the 
econoinies,  olie  can  forcefiilly  defeild  iildependeiit  exchange  rate 
policies. 
The  exchange  rate  pass-through  (EPT)  refers  to the  destination 
currency iinport price changes with respect to a one percent  cliailge 
in tlie exchange rate between exportiilg and importiiig countries. Tl-ie 
relationship  betweeii iiilport prices aild exchange rates  is cnicial iii 
the seilse tliat devaluatioii is expected to iinprove the short-iuii coin- 
petitive position of a country that obseives its currency depreciatiilg. 
If ai1 exchange rate iiistrument llas at least a shoi-t-run impact on a 
co~iiitiy's  coinpetitiveness, ai1 incomplete EPT is a partial explanation 
for the fainous J-curve result in international trade. Einpirical studies 
conducted so far give strong suppoi-t for incoinplete EPT. 
The fourth concept captures microecoiloinic fouildatioils of price 
adjustinents wit11  respect  to  exchange rate changes. The priciilg-to- 
rnarket  (PTM)  refers  to  the  strategie  pricing  behaviom  of  fir~ns engaged in iiiternational trade. Sonie inultiiiational finiis may find it 
in their strategic interest iiot to reflect exchaiige rate swings in their 
local  cuireiicy  prices.  If  tlie future prospects  are positive  multiiia- 
tional tlilns inay allow fluctuations in their profit margiiis. Tliis inay 
be due to their interest in protecting their market share or due to the 
existente  of  the  sunk  cost  aiid  exchaiige  rate  uncertaiiity.  PTM 
explicitly focuses on the intei~iational  price discriininatioii of multi- 
national firins iii a doinestic market. Coiisequeiitly, LOP is ofteii vio- 
lated via firm specific pricing decisions2. 
Altliougli exchange rate pass-through and pricing-to-inarket have 
been recogiiized a long time ago, they oiily gained atteiltion after the 
publication of the seininal papers of IO-ugiiiaii (1986) and Dornbusch 
(1987) iiotiiig a less thaii proportioiial fa11 of US domestic prices with 
respect to an appreciation of the US dollar in the early 19801s,  coin- 
plemeiited by an insufficient adjustment in the foreigil prices3. Later 
011,  several empirica1 studies verified incomplete pass-tlirough (EPT) 
and priciiig-to-marltet (PTM) as coininon evidence in different iiiter- 
national  goods  markets.  Although  there  are  iiuinerous  conflictiiig 
reports about the level and the stability of the pass-through relation- 
qhi~;  it  iq coinmonlv accented tliat there is no oiie-to-one relationship 
betweeii the changes in exchaiige rates aiid price adjustmeiits. 
In this paper we aiin to provide a survey of some partial eqiiilib- 
rium models dealiiig with two different aspects of international price 
rigidities. First of all, prices do not adjust colitii~uously  with respect 
to  changes in the  exchange rates. Secondly, even if the adjustineiit 
occurs,  it  is  often  iiicomplete  with  respect  to  the  exchange  rate 
changes. These two  odd features of prices  are whicl~  we review in 
tbis paper. We  shall refer to the iiicoinpleteiiess andior discontinuity 
of  price  adjustmeiits  as  "the  international  price  rigidities  after 
exchange rate shocks". 
Bulk of tlie literature focuses on the incoinplete price adjustments. 
Both static aild dyiiainic aspects of incoinplete price adjustments are 
explored in oiigoiilg research. Static aspects of pricing analysis incor- 
porate  strategic beliaviour  as suggested  by  Bulow  et  al. (1985)  in 
imperfectly  competitive  inarkets  with  product  differentiatioii. 
Dyilainic analyses incorporate competition for market share or sulik 
costs and enhance our understandii~g  of price adjustinent of individ- 
ual finns. 
Discontinuity feature of the price adjustinents gained only limited 
attention within the international context although tliere exists ample evidence that noininal price chaiiges occur oilly iii discrete jumps4. 
Tlie arguinents used to support this position rely oii tlie existence of 
soine adjustinent costs, iiiore popularly oii tlie ineilu costs'. 
Recent research in iiiteniational iiiacroeconoiiiics  atteinpts to cap- 
ture  these  cominonly  observed  features  of  iiitertiatioilal  prices 
derived froin rnicrofouiidations. As Betts arid Devereux (2000) iiote 
pricing-to-inarket plays a ci-ucial role iii tlie excliaiige rate detenniiia- 
tion  and  intenzatioiial busiiiess  cycles. The presence  of  pricing-to- 
market  limits  tlie  role  of  exchange  rate  policies  to  iiicrease  or 
decrease  aggregate  deniaiid  in  a  certaiii  countiy.  A  successfiil 
exchailge rate policy poteiitially requires larger shocks to fiindainen- 
tals thereby increasiiig the volatility of exchailge rates. Secondly, ai1 
aggregate  priciiig-to-inarket  ineans  departure  froin  tlie  PPP. 
Therefore  it  coilstraiils  the  cotnoveiiients  of  consuniption  across 
coutitries  whereas  increasing  the  comoveinents  of  output  across 
countries. Incorporatioil of inicrofouildations  for internatioilal  price 
stickiness iii the  geiieral  eq~~ilibriuin  analysis proves  to be  crucial. 
However,  geiieral eq~iilibrium  niodels  are beyoiid  the  scope of this 
survey paper6. 
The paper  is or.qanized as follows. Section  TT presentr  short-ten?? 
inodels  of  iiicoinplete  price  adjustnieiits.  Section  I11  surveys  the 
dyiiaiiiic aspects of  iiicoinplete price adjustinent and  its  iinpact  o11 
inarket  structure.  Sectioii  IV  discusses  briefly  tlie  discontinuity 
aspects  of  internatioiial  price  rigidities.  Section V  suiiiinarizes  the 
eiiipirical fïildiilgs oii intenlational price rigidities, botli for iilcoin- 
pleteness and discoiitiiiuity aspects. Finally, section V1 coilcludes. 
11.  INCOMPLETE PRICE CHANGES: STATIC APPROACHES 
Multinatioiial firms usually talte excliailge rate fluctuatioiis seriously 
since exchailge rate swings directly affect profit inargins. Therefore 
excliaiige rate shoclcs influence pricing, output and investineilt deci- 
sions of iiidividual finns7. 
111  this sectioii, we shall present a survey of statie inodels. In statie 
settings, firms  are concerned with period-by-period  change iii  the 
profitability  of their business with respect  to exchange rate shocks. 
Therefore  the  level  of  ecoiioinic  exposure to  internatioiial  shocks 
detenniiies the size and tiiniiig of a firni's price chaiige aiid strategie 
priciiig  across  finnsx. Eleinents  of  imperfect  coinpetitioii,  such  as product  differentiation,  oligopolistic coinpetition  and vertical  rela- 
tio~iships  in multiilatioiial productioii and trading activities shed soine 
liglit o11  the pricing process in iiiternational inarkets. 
A. Elcrs f  ici 9  Appl~oach 
We caii easily relate tlie coiicept of pass-tlirough to tlie demand and 
s~ipply  elasticities  of exports and imports. We  start with tlie defini- 
tions  provided  by  Meiion  (1995).  The  deinand  f~lnction  for  ai1 
iinported good can be written as: 
whereas we caii write tlie supply function for the saine good as being: 
y,  represents the q~iantity  demanded,  y,  the quantity s~ipplied  and 
e the iioininal exchange rate. Differentiation of tlie above expressions 
with  respect  to  prices  aiid  solving  for  the  equilibrium  conditioli 
yields9: 
simplifying the expressioii results in: 
Tliis  eq~~ation  has  a  siinple  inteiyretatioil.  The  change  iil  the 
domestic price is a f~liiction  of deinaiid  aiid supply elasticities for 
iriiports.  If the  deiiiaiid  aiid  (or)  supply for iinports  are perfectly 
elastic,  the  doinestic  price  response  will  always  be  in  liile  with 
exchange rate chaiiges. Iii other words, exclialige rate pass-tlii-ough 
will  be  complete. This  is not  a  realistic  result. There  is iiothiiig 
inherent  in  tlie  ailalysis  tliat  can  capture  tlie  tiniing  of  price 
response,  inarket structures as iilstitutions  and undei-Iyiiig quantity 
respoiise of the firms. Further we wil1 look at other tools of aiialysis 
developed  by  different  scholars,  wliich  provided  an  atteinpt  to uilderstand  tlie uiiderlying  cl~aracteristics  of tlie  pricing-to-inarket 
phenornenon. 
B. Mnrlcet Strr~ctzire  nnd Prodzict Differentintion 
1. Quaiitity Competition 
The elasticity  approach  is not  sufficieiit to  account  for  iiicoinplete 
price responses to exchange rate shocl<s.  Product differentiatioii and 
oligopolistic  competitioii coine as iiahiral candidates to  explain the 
violation of the Law of One Price iii the goods inarkets. Iii ai1 inlpos- 
taiit paper Donibuscli (1987) provided a straightforward explanation 
why oligopolistic coinpetitioii and product differeiitiatioii niay lead to 
iiicoinplete adjustinent of priceslO. 
Due to tlie simplicity  aiid intuitive nature  of its results, we shall 
present  a version  of tlie Donibusch inodel. In a n-film inodel with 
constant  inarginal  cost  techiiology-,  aiid  liiiear  deinaiid  filnctioiis, 
domestic and foreign finns engage in a q~iantity  competition with dif- 
ferentiated products. We  caii write the profit fuiictioii for the domes- 
tic films as beiiig: 
and the foreign finns profit function is represented as: 
where p stands for prices, y stands for output aiid e for the iioininal 
exchange rate. Furthermore, subscript D is for a doinestic and s~ib- 
script F is for a foreign country". For the sake of siinplicity, assunie 
that the finns use the saiiie constant inarginal cost technology to pro- 
d~~ce  the final good (i.e.  c,  = c,  ). Secoiidly, it is assuined that inar- 
kets  are  segmented, iiieaiiiiig  that tlie supply responses  to  deinaild 
shocks iii, say, the doinestic niarket, has no implications oii the sup- 
ply response  in the foreign inarket. And thirdly we assutne a liiiear 
denland fi~iiction  represented  as  Y,  =n  -Op,, so that we can write 
the total supply in the domestic inarket as  Y,  = H,,-~,~,  +n,~>,,, ,  where 
N  =n, +  lir  represents tlie total iiuinber of firms active in the domes- 
tic market. We  assuiile that the reaction fi~nctions  of tlie Couinot coinpetitioii 
are dowiiward sloping. These best response  functions represent  the 
response  of the  firiiis witli respect  to  their  opponent's strategy. In 
i~iost  cases  we  have  dowiiward  sloping  reaction  functions  in  the 
Coui-not  Coiiipetition  with  liliear  delnaiid  aiid  cost  specifications. 
This iinplies that fii~ns'  actioiis are strategic substitutes (see Bulow, 
Geaiiakoplos and Kleiliperer (1985))12. 
Talting the first order conditioils to calculate the equilibriuin level 
of prices in the domestic iliarltet leads to tlie following price expres- 
sioii: 
where N= n~ f  n  F  . We  can write the price elasticities with respect to 
exchange rates: 
wliich shows that uilder tile clournot ser-up the prices are expliciiiy 
dependent  o11  tlie  nuilibcr  of  fims in  the  doinestic  inarket.  Ai1 
increase of the nuinber of the foreign finns (large nlarket power of 
the foreign  firms in the domestic marltet) wil1 teiid to push-up  the 
prices in liiie with the exchange rate depreciatioii. Hence, under per- 
fect competition tliis relation tends to be coinplete and exchange rate 
changes are iieutralized by the adjustinents iii prices. Naturally, the 
weaker competition on the side of the foreign firnis operatilig in the 
doinestic  country  teilds  to  generate  less  than  proportional  price 
adjustinent wit11 respect to exchange rate shocks. 
The price to inarginal cost relation (represented by the second ten11 
on tlie left liand side of the expression) allows us to derive an inter- 
esting conclusion. The more competitive  tlie foreign firnis  (sinaller 
inark-up) the higher the domestic price adjustinent wil1 be. 
Tlius,  tlie  siinple  Cournot  model  of  Dornbuscli  is  capable  of 
accou~iting  for  the  incomplete  dornestic  price  adjustinents  witli 
respect to exchange rate shocks as a fuiiction of both the coiicen- 
tratiori  and the  share  of trade. An  interesting  aspect  of quaritity 
coinpetition  analysis  is  its  account  of  incomplete  adjustinent  of 
prices  without  any reliance  on product  differentiation. Naturally, price  adjustinents  i11  the  opposite  direction  occur  in  tlie  foreigil 
countryl7. 
2.  Price Coiiipetitioil with Product Differetitiation 
Dornbusch  (1987)  offered  an alteinative price  coinpetitioii  inodel 
usiiig Salop's spatial coinpetitioil fraiiiework. 111  this set-up doines- 
tic aiid foreigil firnis are located equidistantly and alternating on a 
circleI4. The  inodel  iinplies  a  two-stage  gaine.  111  the  first  stage 
firms decide to enter the iiiarket. In the secoild stage they cornpete 
in prices. The etitry decision depeiids o11 tlie disutility of coiisuiners 
per unit of distance, which  in fact represents the level of product 
differentiation, the market size and the fixed costs the firins iiiciir 
when  they  enter  the  market.  Thus,  the  equilibrium  number  of 
entrants is determined endogenously, when the size of the market is 
given. 
Next,  Dornbusch  (1987)  derives  the  elasticities  with  respect  to 
exchange  rate  shocks. Foreign  finns camot perfectly  adjust  their 
prices with respect to excliaiige rate shocks. Full adjustment of prices 
would induce them to loose their iiiarket shares if they prod~ice  close 
".,hc+:t.,4p~  aLilroiiL\iLrv  e-  i.d  ~GIxCU:iSal;5-  ,LdL,~ibb~t  +7c,-?  ~IULL~~L~.  T6~t,  GIG  Du~-I~~Du~G~ 
model fails to  account for long-term iinplications  of exchange rate 
shocks,  iii other words  entiy and exit is excluded, siilce tlie inodel 
iiiiplicitly relies  on the assuinption that doinestic aiid foreign firms 
altemate arouild the unitary circle. Iti fact Salop's inodel is desigiied 
to account for entry and exit decisioiis of the finns. The assumption 
that finns alteniate arouiid the circle does not allow one to address 
issues of market structure. We  wil1 coine back to an extensioii of the 
Salop model when we investigate dyiiainic models and market struc- 
ture changes'j. 
3. Input Price Shocks 
Input prices can play a crucial role in explaii~iiig  tlie price stickiness 
at the  fiilal goods level. A siinple  illustrative  example  goes  as fol- 
lows. Assume a devaluatioil that automatically improves the compet- 
itiveness  of  tlie  finlis  located  in  the  doinestic  couiltry  defined  in 
tenns  of  doinestic  currency.  Tlie  foreign  finn's  prices  defined  in 
terms of the domestic currency wil1 go up, wliereas domestic prices 
do  not  change.  Iii  the  foreign  country,  however,  there  wil1  be  a 
change in the opposite directioil. A doniestic firin's prices defiiied in terins  of  the  doiiiestic  currency  will  be  less,  whereas  tlie  foreign 
firins' prices iii their owii country ceteris paribus do iiot change. Tliis 
represeilts the direct effect of devaluatioii as discussed iii tlie section 
presenting inodels of quantity coinpetitioii. On the other hand, trade 
iiitegration is certaiiily relevant for inputs as well. Priinary and inter- 
mediate goods play a crucial role iii total trade transactions. Thus a 
devaluatioii of the doinestic curreiicy is likely to iilcrease the produc- 
tioii costs of the doiiiestic finiis, when part of the inputs are iinported 
froin abroad. Iinporting iiiputs will be more expensive and the costs 
of production  of the fiiial conimodity will increase in line with the 
exchange rate change. This clearly represents the iiidirect effects of 
exchange rate shocks and these offsetting effects have strong policy 
iiiiplicatioils for exchange rate pass-through and exchange rate poli- 
ties. 
Here, there  are two  empirical  facts that  are worth the  inention. 
Firstly,  empirical studies have wel1 documented the fact that  soine 
primary  and inteimediate goods prices  do not  completely adjust to 
nomina1 exchange rate  shocks16. This is particularly  interesting for 
priiiiary  goods,  which  are  usually  characterized  by  their  homoge- 
neous  nature.  Secoiidly,  empirica1  research  shows  the  substantial 
Impact oI' input price efIects d~ie  to exchange rale shocks oli tile finai 
good prices". 
Knetter  (1993), Athulcorala  and Meiion  (1994),  and  Campa aiid 
Goldberg ((1995), (1997)) give a partial account of the relevance of 
these input price shocks. A recent study by Aksoy and Riyanto (2000) 
developed a two stage game model whereiii different institutioilal set- 
ups, in other words vei-tical iiltegration and vertical separation, aiid 
strategic interactioii  ainong the flnns inatter. A vertically integrated 
firin,  or iii other words,  a finn engaged  in  the production  of both 
iiiputs and final goods, will have a strategic advantage in decidiiig the 
input  prices  it  will  charge  as  higher  strategic  input  priciiig  may 
iiicrease its rivals' costs. I11  line with certaiii conclusioiis reached in 
the  strategic  trade  literature  regarding  vertically  related  inarkets, 
exchange rate changes will influeilce the pricing decisions in a simi- 
lar way'!  When  tlie  foreign  inarket  is  characterized by vertically 
integrated  firms and the  domestic  inarlcet is iiot, an  exchaiige  rate 
shock is lilcely to lead to a higher level of pass-through in the final 
goods market. This arises due to the market power of the foreign finn 
in the inputs market that makes the adjustmeilt of prices in the final 
goods inarket straightforward. 111. INCOMPLETE PRICE CHANGES: DYNAMIC APPROACHES 
The static literature is pal-tially capable of accounting for iiicomplete 
price adjust~nents  iii the final goods marltets, Although tliey provide 
inhlitive explanations for incomplete price adjustments wliat is likely 
to  be  inissed  is  how  price  adjustiiients  talte  place  over  time  and 
whether iiicoinpleteness  is a persistent  1 permanent  fact. Exchange 
rate  expectatioiis  are  iieglected  and  fii-iiis  priciiig  decisions  are 
abstracted  froin time. Its results are depeiideiit on the nature of the 
coinpetitioi~,  assuinptions  about  the  strategie  interaction  betweeil 
coinpeting firms aiid  the  shape of the  deinand  and  cost  fuiictions. 
Naturally,  static  analysis does iiot talte  int0  consideration eventual 
changes in the inarket structure due to a nomina1 shock. Its underly- 
iiig assuinptioii is that in the long-r~lii  inacroeconoinic aggregates are 
not  affected by monetary sliocks.  However, recent  research proved 
that the inherent  dynainics of the pricing process  are crucial. Here, 
finns' interest lies in the expected value of the finn rather than on the 
period-by-period profits os revenues wliere the finli's value is mea- 
sured as the present discounted value of expected future cash flows. 
Essentially,  a  siinple  modificatioii  in  the  analysis  to  capture 
dynamics can lead to  an interesting aiid very powerf~~l  result. If  a 
shock on tlie iiolninal exchange rates caii trigger persistent and even 
pennaneiit effects on the trading relationships (aiid hence on the real 
ecoiioiny) this brings one essentially at odds with the idea of long- 
tenn neutrality  of inonetary slioclts which underlies  al1 maiiistream 
(New Keynesiaii os a Real Business Cycle) macroeconoinic inodels. 
The q~restioii  then becomes:  May an exchange  rate  shock cause  a 
change iii tlie inarltet structure? 
The answer is yes. Iiicorporation of sunk costs in a dynaniic fraine- 
work establislies tliis result. In the following sectioiis we will provide 
ai1  overview  of  the  literature  capturing priciiig  dyiiainics  after  ai1 
exchaiige rate shock. We  wil1 divide the  literature into  supply- aiid 
deinand side analysis. These inodels are what we will tuni to in tlie 
following subsections. 
If exchange rate shocks trigger entry and exit on the side of the inter- 
nationally active trade  finns iii  a certain doinestic  inarket,  we  are 
im~nediately  confronted with marlcet struchire changes. These are two lines  of  research  with  sunk cost  arguineiits: The beaclihead inodel 
aild a inodel of circular coinpetition. We  explaiil fii-st the beachhead 
inodel. 
1. Tlie Beachhead Model 
Hysteresis literature captures the dyiiaiiiic implications that exchange 
rate shocks may liave on the marltet struct~ire.  Teinporaiy exchange 
rate shocks caii have perinaiient effects via its iiifluence on the inar- 
ket stnicture. According to Baldwii~  (1988) a fiiin iiicurs sonie fixed 
costs wlieii it enters in a particular export market (costs of marketing, 
distributioii networks, brand iiaine establishment  and so 011).  These 
costs are suiik, such that they are not recoverable once the finn has 
eiitered the inarket. However, by entering the inarltet, finns anticipate 
tlieir expected discounted flow of net profits  at least to cover these 
sunk costs in the fi1ture19. Put differeiitly, sunk costs determine the 
number of finns acting in the market. On the other hand, firms usu- 
ally incur a recurrent fixed cost in order to inaintain their gained mar- 
ket shares. (for instance, costs of regular advertisement, extension of 
distribution networks etc.) Such maintenance costs directly affect the 
level of profits of tlie finns in the domestic inarket. 
A change in the exchange rate inay lead to foreign finns chailgii~g 
their behaviour i11 the domestic inarket. Foreign finiis may be reluc- 
tant to leave the market even if tlieir operatiiig profits becoine nega- 
tive  diie  to,  say,  devaluation,  beca~ise  of  the  sunk  costs  already 
incurred. Tliis decisioii will be explicitly depeiident on the perception 
of tlie iiature of tlie shock. The size and persisteiice of the exchange 
rate shock is the key to the exit Istay decision. Alternatively, siilce re- 
entry includes a regeiieratioli of suiik costs, finns may take this into 
coiisideratioii before they decide to leave the domestic inarket. 
Tlius, this  model has  the  feature  of being  able to accouiit for a 
pricing-to-masliet  range  where  the  inarket  stnicture  will  ilot  be 
affected  and  tlie  import prices  will  be  less  respoilsive  (temporary 
pricing-to-inarket  effects)  as  wel1 as for pelmailent  changes iii the 
inarket struckire (peimaiient exit and entry  effect^)^^. 
Let US briefly present the inodel. Using a sliglitly modified version 
of the  Spence and Dixit  and  Stiglitz  (S-D-S)  frainework,  Baldwin 
(1988)  assuines  perfect  foresight  and  therefore  a fully  predictable 
detenninistic  exchange  rate  path,  whereas  Baldwin  aild  Krugman 
(1989) allow for more realistic stochastic behavior of exchange rates. We  focus oil the Baldwin's version (1988) that wil1 serve as the 
beilchinark framework. Let us express the discouilted flow of f~lhire 
profits gross of sunk cost for the domestic frin as a case iii which 
wliere finns produce a variety of a pal-ticular good y and engage iii 
quaiitity conipetitioil: 
n,,  =[~(R~P,~~I,J;,  hl,  -w,  -F)  -S 
'=o  l 
aild for the foreign firm: 
where parameter F represents the recurrent fixed costs to be paid at 
every period. S represents tlie sul*  costs incurred when finlis decided 
to enter the inarket at t=l. Note tliat S aiid F are assuined to be equal 
l  across finns and varieties, but S>F. Let us denote  R' = -  ,  with r 
I+I- 
being  the  constailt  market  discount  factor  and  e  as  the  nomina1 
c~~li~ii~~i:  Sll~  VCLI;~L;L  ,t1  ~eplebcl~~b  ~ilc  IO~U~  11u1liie1 of VUII- 
etiesZ2.  The  iiiiplication  of  the  S-D-S  model  is  that  the  inverse 
demaiid fililctions are ideiltical across firins, although they are for a 
different variety. 
Equatioils  (9) aild  (10) indicate  films' decision  rule  to  enter tlie 
domestic marlcet. They ailticipate covering at least the sunk cost they 
iilcurred,  oiice they  decide to  enter tlie  doinestic marltet. 111  otlier 
words, they calculate the expected discouilted flow of net profits to 
be at least  eqiial to  S. Therefore, we  cal1 derive the  entry and  exit 
coilditions  of  the  doinestic  and foreigii firrns froin the  discouilted 
reduced form profits (igiloriilg the integer problein) aild write: 
Eiltry: R'  "On, >F  and R' *On, > F  (11) 
Exit:  R1*OrI, <OatidR'*OrI, <O  (1  2) 
wherc OTI  represeilts tl~e  optiinal profits from the first order coildi- 
tioiis.  Note thai  (11) represeilts  entry  condiiions  for  domestic  and 
foreign  fii~ns  and  (12) the  exit coi~ditions~~.  The  gap  between  the 
exit-  and  entry  conditions clearly provides the  explanation for tl~e liysteresis result of the Baldwin inodel. Iii tliis set-up, the firn1 nuin- 
ber can cliaiige in the period-by-period equilibria. 
An  exchaiige rate sliock typically drives finns away froin tlie sym- 
inetric equilibriuiz?. Iii this case, large and sinall devaluations have 
different iinplications for inarket stnicture. A smal1 devaluation does 
iiot cliange tlie inarket structure. Firms stay in the market even if they 
accuinulate losses during the deviatioii period  of the exchange rate 
froin its PPP level. Iii order to protect their inarket shares, these firms 
price  to  inarket,  which  is  calculated  froin the price  elasticities  of 
exchange rates. Baldwin  shows that under  sinall devaluations tliere 
will be iio decrease in the varieties. Wheii the excllange rate returns 
to its initial value, prices adjust fully and pre-shock equilibrium is re- 
established. 
Iii  case of large  devaluations,  some fims will  fiiid  it profitable 
rather to leave the market. Thus, due to a decrease in the variety, less 
than  proportional  price  adjustment  wil1  not  be  restored  when  the 
exchange rate returns to its initial level. Price levels aiid trade vol- 
umes will change ineversibly. 
Dixit  (1989)  and  Baldwiii  and  Kruginan  (1989)  extended 
Baldwin's  framework by  relaxiiig  the  detenniiiistic  exchange  rate 
patli. Baldwin and Knigmaii (1989) model the exchange rate as an 
i.i.d. random  variable. More  interestingly,  the  entry-exit  decisioiis 
(and therefore als0 tlie market stnicture) are allowed to give feedback 
to  the exchange rate. Their basic  coiiclusion  is that  when  a large 
exchange rate  shock provokes  sufficiently  large  capital  inflows  or 
outflows i11  a doinestic country, the exchange rate caiinot retiiin to its 
initial value. This result is the outcoii~e  of entry aiid  exit decisioiis 
and causes a structural break in the equilibriurn excliaiige rate. 
Dixit (1989) inodels exchange rates as followiiig a random walk24. 
His  concl~isions  are  in  line  with  those  of Baldwin  and  Krugman. 
However, lie  also  relaxes  the  assuinption  of  invariaiit  sunk  costs. 
With  asyminetric  sunk costs across firms he  fiiids that those firms 
with the siliallest suiik cost will be the first to eiiter aiid the first to 
leave. If the currency stai-ts to appreciate foreign firins with relatively 
siiiall sunk costs will  start to  eiiter. If the exchange rate reverts to 
establish its PPP level, the firms with  smaller sunk eiitry costs will 
exit, and those having invested a larger suin in  order to  enter, will 
stay in the domestic market and will price to e nar ket'^. 
Baldwiii  aiid  Lyons  (1994)  analyzed  the  long-tenn  effects  of 
exchange rate shocks at the cross-section of Dornbusch's overshoot- ing inodel and the sunk cost arguinent. Their results confii~n  the pre- 
vious literature. Furtheimore, the applicatioii of the Donibuscli model 
allows thein to derive some teiitative policy conclusions. They argue 
that giveii that prices are sticky, a inonetary shoclí will translate to a 
greater likeliliood  of hysteresis. Tliis is a clialleiige to Doi~ibusch's 
inodel  that  foresees  a  long-teim  neutrality  of  (noininal)  policy- 
iiiduced shoclts. 
Another contribution to tlie hysteresis literakire is inade by Lin aiid 
Tseng (1993). Iii their model they look at the pemaiient impact of the 
devaluatioiis on the curreiit account via macroeconoinic decisioii vari- 
ables such as consu~nption  and iiivestinent. Effects of the exchange rate 
on the labour iiiarlíet are also analyzed. They combine the Dixit-Stiglitz 
inodel (fixed inarl-up over constaiit inargiiial cost) iii an interteinporal 
maxiinization fsamework with tlie s~uik-cost  argument of Baldwin and 
find that devaluatioii would firstly decrease tlie sunk and niaintenaiice 
costs of a foreign film measured in the foreign currency. This would 
make the eiitrance of firms int0 the doinestic market cheaper and would 
lead to aii increase in iiivestinent so that individuals should instanta- 
neously  aild  pennaneiltly  decrease  tlleir  consuinption  in  order  to 
accornmodate the new enti-aiits os iiew varieties, whicli will decrease 
labo~ir  demand. This piits pressure o11  real wages, aild therefore doines- 
tic real wages decrease. This apparently constitutes a boost in tlie over- 
all intertemporal profits of the inc~unbeiit  firin. Iii the long-nin foreign 
asset stock would be reduced so that the current account deteriorates. 
2.  Sunk  Costs aiid Circular Aspects 
Alísoy and Lustig (1998) use a inodified version of the Salop inodel 
for  spatial  coinpetitioii.  As  inentioiied  earlier,  Donibusch's  (1987) 
account of Salop's model does not cover entry aiid exit decisions. In 
fact, Salop's inodel is desigiied for this purpose. Agaiii tlie existente 
of sunk entry costs is the key for understanding the hysteresis result. 
A foreigii hoinogeneous good producer will be more vulnerable to 
devaluatioiis  than  a  firtn producing  a  highly  differentiated brand, 
where consumers buy only one brand of a particular product. Altsoji 
and Lustig (1998) identify the foreign film which is due to exit after 
an exchange rate shock and are able to show that excliaiige rate trig- 
gered price increases are more lilíely to occur than exchange rate trig- 
gered price decreases. Entry req~iires  high sunk costs, whereas exit is 
either costless or less costly. Both types of supply side analysis slied some light oii soine recent 
observations. As Friberg (1999) notes followiiig the Koreaii exchange 
rate crisis Volvo took the oppot-tunity to buy part of a Korean film 
Sainsung hence strengtheiied its position. Siinilarly, General Motors, 
Ford, P&G aiid Shell, al1 were loolting Korean finns to purcliase. As 
the sunk costs approaches to nil (in tenns of doinestic curreiicy), it 
becoines  easier for inultinational fii~~is  to enter a couiitiy either for 
trading  or investineilt purposes. Most  iinportantly, a change  in  the 
inarket structure, therefore a change in tlie prodiictioii process, trig- 
gers a violation of long rui1 iieutrality of a iiominal variable, namely 
exchange rates. 
Demand side analysis is a coinpleinent  to  supply side analysis. As 
Froot aiid Kleinperer ((1989) p.638) pilt it, iii both types of dynamic 
inodels, firms caii inake iiiitial investmeiits in foreign inarkets that 
give them the opportunity to earn future profits. In supply side inodels 
these  investments  talte  the  fonn  of  sales  iiifrastructure,  whereas 
demand side inodels investinents purchase consuiner allegiance. Both 
of  these  can be  interpreted  as  firm  specific  investments  in  either 
invisible assets or fuhlre deinands. 
Demand  side  ailalysis results  are  independent  of  eiltry and  exit 
decisions and exchange rate uiicertainty. Hence, these inodels do not 
iinply liysteresis but coiifinn pricing-to-inarket result froin the static 
theoiy. 
1. Competition for Marltet Share 
Firins' future demands and profits are depeiideilt on their current mar- 
ket  shares. Brand loyalty of coiisumers is a coininon pheiiornenon. 
Switching costs, transaction  costs  of  switcliing suppliers  or  search 
costs may iilduce coiisumers to coiisuine the same brand of a prodilct. 
Due to the existence of such rigidities, past inarket shares would inat- 
ter when firms decide on their pricing strategies. As a coiisequence, 
aily expected chaiige i11 the exchaiige rate wil1 influence the value of 
current  inarltet  share  and  thus  wil1 affect tlie pricing  behaviour  of 
finiis. Froot and Klemperer (1989) address this idea in a two period 
oligopolistic  competition  setting  witli perfect  capita1 mobility  in  a 
doinestic inarket. 111  the case of appreciatioil of the doinestic cuisency their fiiidings 
suggest tliat the foreign finns price more aggressively in the domes- 
tic  inarltet in  order to  gaiii larger inarket share,  if the price  of the 
doinestic currency is expected to stay pennaneiltly at a higher level. 
If exchange rate change is perceived to be temporary, foreign films 
wil1 behave less aggressively. Tliis result hinges on the cost- and real 
interest  effects.  The  cost  effect  is  the  first  period  decrease  (here, 
doinestic  cun-eiicy appreciates)  of  foreign  finns' production  costs. 
This tends to decrease the prices of the foreign finns i11  the doinestic 
inarket. On the other haiid, the real interest effect can be set out as 
follows: a temporary  appreciation  makes  future  doinestic  currency 
profits  of the  foreign firm  relatively  less  valuable  tlian its  cui~eiit 
profits (defined in doinestic cuisency). This ind~lces  tlie foreign finn 
to iilcrease its prices. The relative inagnit~ide  of these two opposiiig 
effects and the perception  of the nature  of the exchange rate shock 
determiiie the prices  in tlie doinestic niarket. The result is iiidepen- 
dent from the type of competition and specific ass~iniptioiis  about the 
inodel. However, potential  perverse  reactions of prices  are  closely 
liiiked with capital inobility. In this skidy the exchange rate path is 
inodelled as a deterininistic  path  aiid  expectatioiis  are  not  formed 
endogeii~usly~~.  Obviously, these  assumptioiis  are  quite restrictive. 
Nevel-theless, the inodel provides  iiiteresting insights int0 the ques- 
tioil. 
Tivig  (1996)  provides  ai1  extension  to  the  work  of  Froot  and 
Klei~iperer.  She argues that the microeconoinic foundations  of  the 
J-cuive hinges oii the intertemporal inaxiinization problein. 111  a two- 
period inodel of d~iopolistic  coinpetitioil witli differeiltiated products 
and coi~stailt  inargilia1 costs  she relaxes  the  assumptioii of perfect 
capita1 inobility.  Tivig  finds,  regardless  of  the  degree  of  capita1 
niobility, possibility  of  'perverse'  price  reactions  to  chaiiges in the 
excliaiige rates. The reason for this fiiidillg is tl~e  iilterteinporal profit 
inaximizatioil hypothesis itself. With coinpleineiitary demaiids d~iop- 
olists are iiot forced to operate each period  in the elastic regio11 of 
their deinand f~lnctions,  which generates the poteiitial perverse out- 
come. Iii this fraineworl<,  a first period perverse reaction is possible. 
In the secoiid period this caii be coi-rected. 
Broadly speakiiig, demand side aiialysis does not iiecessarily argue 
for a pemianeiit  impact of noiniilal exchange rates changes. In this 
sense tliis type of analysis can be grouped together wit11  static analy- 
sis of PTM aiid EPT. IV.  DISCONTINUOUS PNCE CHANGES: MENU COSTS 
A fuiidainental observation that uiiderlies the New-Keynesian analy- 
sis is that ecoiiomic decisions are ofteii characterized by periods of an 
iilactive  state that  is  followed by  a change in prices. Price  adjust- 
inents do iiot follow iioininal changes immediately  (in otlier words, 
these  are discoiitinuous).  Current researcli  oii price  dynainics  sug- 
gests that finiis apply a siinple price change sule in which real (uiiob- 
served) prices  fluctuate betweeii  two  predetermiiied  bounds. Fii~iis 
take an action if aiid only if real prices reach one of these bounds and 
we observe price clianges. Accordiiig to (among others) Sheshiiislti 
and Weiss (1983) these bouiids  are deterinined by the price adjust- 
ment costs firms face. This type of liiiear os fixed adjustinent costs is 
often referred to as inenu costs. A precise description of the ineiiu 
costs  is  not  provided  in the  literahlre. However,  one  can thii~k  of 
ineiiu costs as Fluet aiid Phaiieuf (1997) put: 
".. . i11 I-esponse  fo  si?znll sl~ìfis  ;i17  detnnii~i,  inzperjectly con7pefitivejì1.m~  do 
nat adjtwf theii-pïices, becn~ise,  stnrtiiig ji*or?z theprojìt rnn.~iinizingpiice- 
qua~itiq  conzhinatior?. the gains  in pi-qj;ts jiom  s~?zall  changes  in prices 
nr-P nnli) crcnwd-ni,rIei. " 
According to the literuture, tliese costs kasically represeiit the adiniii- 
istrative and executive costs of changing the price~'~. 
The coinmonly applied iiietliodology that analyses iiifrequent price 
adjustinent i11  the dynamic context is borrowed  froin the inventory 
inodels, the so-called SS  poli~ies~~.  Iii tliis framework, timing of price 
changes is  endogeilously  determined. However, the iiiaiii difficulty 
lies  iii the  einpirical applications, siiice price  adjustinent costs  are 
unobservable. 
Tlieoretically, the incosporatioii of the ineiiu costs in tlie dynaniic 
setting is quite siiiiilar to tlie iiicoiporation of tlie  sunk costs in the 
analysis of price stickiiiess. The inaiii difference lies in tlie research 
scope. The sunk cost argument provides tlie iiituition to ~iiiderstand 
the market structure changes, in other words, pennanent incomplete 
price adjustiiieiits. The iiieiiu cost arguinent becoines useful in uilder- 
standing  the  discontinuity  of  price  changes  after  exchange  rate 
shocks. 
However, the applications of SS ecoiiomies to the observed price 
rigidities in the inteinational econoinic eiivironment had to wait for 
rather a long time. To  our luiowledge the first (and only) attempt of such an application  is  given by Delgado (1991) within  a dyilainic 
programiniilg  frainework.  He derives a fonnal nile  for the  priciilg 
policies of tlle multinational firn~s  active in a domestic inarket. 111  liis 
model, exchange  rates  follow  a  geoinetric  Browiliaii inotion with 
drift, which plausibly  resembles  reality. Rather thaii applyiilg fixed 
menu costs he uses iilcreasing inenu costs. Menu costs largely result 
from the increased advertisilig that films have to iilcur to retain their 
lost con~uiners~~.  Foreign firms inaxiinize the net discounted value of 
flow profits  minus  inenu costs. More foimally, the  finn solves the 
following value fiiilction (V) of the internatioilal business as a fiinc- 
tion of the product prices (P) and the nomiilal exchange rate (S): 
where P, represeilts the flow profits  quoted in local currency, I the 
iildex function of changing the prices,  z!  the  cost of iiicreasiiig the 
price and d tlie cost of decreasiilg the price, whicli are depeiident on 
the size of the price change (see Delgado (1991)). Briefly said, the 
film's problein  is to inaxin~ize  the exnected value of the discn?ini~d 
flow of net profits over the menu costs it faces in each period. Wheil 
the net profit flow over the iiifinite tiine horizon exceeds the costs of 
changiiig the prices, the firm would be williilg to change its prices. 
Solution witli optinlal stopping suggests the existence of bouiids of 
inaction within which prices reinain unchanged. In such ai1 analysis, 
analytica1 solutions  are  in  general  difficult  to  obtaiil.  Therefore, 
Delgado assesses the impact of exchange rate shocl<s  oii prices in the 
presence  of  inenu  costs  with  il~iinerical analysis.  Coinparative 
dyiiamics  with  pla~isible  paraineter  specifications  iinply  that  finns 
will  change  their  prices  if  and  only  if  the  real  price  reaches  the 
bouilds  of  inaction  that  is  detennined  by  the  inenu  costs  and 
exchange  rate  variability. However,  once the bouild  of  inaction  is 
reached, adjustmeiit will be coinplete, a result that is not in liile with 
the einpirical regularity of incomplete price adjustinents. 
V.  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Substantial research  has been  devoted  to the issue  of price  adjust- 
ments  with  respect  to  exchange  rate  changes. Generally, einpirical fiildiilgs oii priciilg-to-iiiarket  and exchange rate pass-thsough show 
that exchange rate iilduced price discrimination iii iiiteniational inar- 
kets is cnicial iii alinost al1 iiiaiiufactui-ing  mai-kets. Tlierefore, eipir- 
ical research largely favors the argument tliat the interilatioilal goods 
markets are ~eginented'~. 
Table 1 provides a selectioii of recent eiiipirical evideilce iii tlie liter- 
ature. 
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1. Incompleteness of Price Changes 
Table 1 provides a suininary of empirica1 evideilce in tlle literature. 
Maiil results froin the literature caii be suinmarized as follows. (See 
also Meilon (1995)). 
Pass-through: degree and dynan2ics 
Incomplete pass-tllrough is a coinmoii and pervasive pheiiomeiloii i11 
the studies surveyed. Only 6 studies repoi-t complete or near coinplete 
pass-tlirough across countries iil different goods markets. 
Pass-through across countries 
Pass-tln-ougli is  sigilificantly  different  across  countries.  Note  that 
these studies opt for different n~ethodologies,  which inakes the corn- 
parisoil inuch harder. Tllerefore, in the following we will refer to the 
study  of Kiletter (1993) wlierein  he  applies  tlie  saine  econoinetric 
inetliodology across countries, which will ease the task. 
Pass-th~ozigh  acr~oss  stzidies jòr  cr  giveri coznit7y 
There are coiiflictiiig reports across studies as concerns the size of the 
pass-through for a giveil country, which is fairly natura1 d~le  to the 
choice of the methodology and data. Pass-throzlgh across prodzicts 
This is a direct test of tlie pricing-to-inarket. Studies report a sti-ongly 
divergent  level  of pass-tlirougli across  couiltries  iii different goods 
markets. International price discriiniilatioii is cominoil. 
Stabilis ofpass-thl-ough 1.elations11ip 
These are nuinerous conflicting reports regarding the persistence aiid 
level of the pass-through relationship. 
Knetter (1993) uses the teilli "local cusseiicy price stability" when he 
conlpares  price  discriminatioii practices  in  the  cross-couiitsy context 
using data for seven-digit iiidiistries for the peiiod of 1973-19873'.  The 
tenii aims to  define the decliile of the foreign producers'  (exporters') 
inark-ups when they are confronted witli a depreciatiiig doinestic cur- 
rency.  Appareiitly,  Japaiiese,  Gerinan  and  Britisli  export  iiidustries 
exhibit inore local cusseiicy price stability than the US expoifs indiis- 
tries in the skidy. However, he  finds in genera1 that, iiidustiy effects 
tend to doininate source country effects in tenns of price discriminatosy 
behavior of firms. Secondly, destinatioii specific mark-up changes are 
very similar across destination inarkets. Tlie degsee of local currency 
price stability is nearly identical across destiiiatioii inarkets for a uartic- 
ular good, which generates doubt regarding tlie belief abo~it  the exis- 
teilce of systeinatic discriinination across coiintries. The third finding 
rejects tl~e  hypothesis of ai1 ideiltical inark-~ip  decline in al1 ind~istries 
within a given destination couiitiy. Thus psice adjustinent exercise has a 
strongly heterogeneous nature across iiidustries within a giveii country. 
The  coinillon  explanation  for  the  preseiice  of  pricing-to-inarket 
found in inost of the studies is the mark-up adjustineilt iii different 
ind~istries.  As Goldberg  and Knetter  (1999) put  it the  existence of 
exchange  rate  iilduced,  destiiiatioil  specific, variation  in  mark-ups 
iinplies that price cannot eq~ial  inarginal cost on shipineiits to al1 des- 
tinatioiis. The finding of price discriinination in the PTM literature 
allows rejection of the nul1 hypothesis of integrated world inarkets. 
Relevanee of Szrrik  Costs 
Iii liile with tlie theoretical research Roberts and Tybout (1997) show 
that sunk costs play a crucial role iii tlie decision to export with the 
use of  Colonibiaii plant  level panel  data over the period  1981-89. 
Tlieir empirica1 findings suggest that theoretical sunk costs literature 
are relevant as the films decisions to export are significantly affected 
by the finns prior relevant export-market experiinents. 2. Discoiitiilility of Price Changes 
Only a few studies analyzed discontiiiuous price adjustinents related 
to meiiu  costs. One lias to reineinbes that  coiiducting  an  einpirical 
study to measure the level of priciiig-to-marltet is ilot necessarily reli- 
able, uiiless these is data at tlie most disaggregated level. The inaiii 
difficulty of analysiiig fin11 specific pricing niles is data availability. 
Firstly,  data  should  contain  iiifonnation  of  a  single  hoinogsileous 
good. Any composite price index bl~irs  analysis of pricing behavior. 
Secondly, in order to be able to pass fair judgeineiit on the individual 
frms' pricing  decisions  one needs  high  frequency price  data  (say, 
weelcly os inoiithly data). Low frequeilcy data hides al1 infonatioii 
about  iii-between  price  adjustment  exercises. Ai1  exceptioii is  the 
study of Gliosh and Wolf (1994) iii whicli they use cover price data 
of the journal The Economist. A probit ailalysis witli a relevant proxy 
for menu costs (deviations from the Law of One Price) led thein to 
conclude that  wlien menu  costs are present, statistically significaiit 
findings of tlie priciiig-to-market behavior inay be spurious. 
The issue of iiicoinplete aild discontinuous adjustment of prices  to 
exchange rate changes is ilot a new one. However, this phenoinenon 
only gaiiied attentioii after the seininal writings of Kruginaii (1986) 
and  Dornbusch  (1987),  wliich  iioted  the  significant  iinpact  of 
exchange rate shocks on trade voluines and several scholars reported 
discontinuous and disproportioilate adjustinent of prices. Recent the- 
oretical  aiid  einpirical  research  devoted  its  attention to  firn1 level 
pricing  behavior  after exchange rate  shoclts underlying the iiicoin- 
plete pass-through aiid the failure of the  law of olie price results in 
different goods niarkets. 
Tliere are two inain streams of aiialysis that evaluate the exchange 
rate induced incoinplete price adjustments in  internatioiial  econoin- 
ics. Statie theoretica1 research pins down tlie iii~poi-taiice  of price dif- 
ferentiation, inarltet size and type of coinpetitioii. Dynaniic aiialysis 
on the other hand  introduces eleinellts  of suilk costs, whicli allows 
accouiiting for tlie stylised facts of hysteresis in iinport voluines and 
price levels. The discoiitinuity feature, however, received relative less 
attention in the international context. Empirica1  evidence  confirms  priciilg-to-inarket  as  a  coini~loil 
strategic behavior of finns. This obviously iinplies that the markets 
are segineiited in inteinational trade activities. However, one should 
be ca~itious  in evaluating the results wlieil inenu costs are preseiit. 
Finally, recent research in the line of New Keyilesiaii international 
inacroeconomics aiins to provide microfoundatioils  for international 
price  stickiness  following  exchange  rate  shocks.  However,  these 
microfoundations heavily rely o11  the incoillpleteiless feature of price 
adjustinents. To our knowledge discontiiluity feature is not explicitly 
take11  int0 account in inodelliilg. 
NOTES 
For  an excellent analysis of  exchange rates  and prices  see Goldberg  and Knetter 
(1997). For a detailed account of PPP failure see Rogoff (1996). 
In order to provide a secure profits films usually engage in hedging activities. A 
detailed discussion of tliese issues is prouided by Friberg (1999). 
See Branson (1972) writings after Smithsoniaii realigimierits. 
See for exainple Cecclietti (1986) or Lach and Tsiddon (1992) for evidence in domes- 
tic  iilflatioiiary environments and  Gosli and  Wolf  (1994)  for  ai1  applicatioii in tlie 
international context. 
R!in?,ei- tt n!. (l 99)  p!-nvi?i- x.xith  v.t!!~rrhl?  iiicide? i??fn!?natior re,orrdir,o tl?e firn, 
specifïc pricing decisions in a doinestic iiiarket. Altliough inteiliational  diinc~lsioils 
ure iieglccted and direct questioiis about strategic interaction aiid coll~ision  are omil- 
ted iron1 tlie survey (in order to provide as inaily responses as possible) it is interest- 
ing to  note  that  the  survey outcome  suggest  that  coordiilation  failures,  (i.e. firi~ns 
holding back o11 price changes waiting for other films to go first) appears as the most 
iinpoitant eleinent in pricing  decisions. Costly price adjustineiit is seen to be rather 
uniinportant. 
For these recently expanding literature see for exainple Obstfeld and Rogoff 
((1995), (19981, (2000)), Betts and Devereux (1996). 
For several ailccdotal evidence covering i~lco~iipleteiless  feature of international 
prices, see Friberg (1999). 
According to Friberg (1999) economic exposure is defiiied as the sensitivity in tlie 
valuc of tlie firm to exchange rate surprises. Finii's value is ineas~ired  as the present 
discounled val~ie  of expected fut~irc  cash llows. In static terms tlie focus is on tlie 
period by period profits or revenucs. 
aD  P, 
9.  Dcfiiiirig elasticity of deniatid as bcing  E, = -- and elasticity OT s~ipply  as being 
SP, !i!, 
dS 
F, = -P,,(P!,e)  (See Meno11 (1995)) 
apr 
10. Baniak aiid Phlips (1995), Kirmail and Plilips (1996) and Hens ct al. (1999) provide 
a similar model in tlie general framework. 
I  I. In  otlicr words,  J,,,,,  stands Cor  the domestic firiii's outp~it  for tl~e  domestic inarket 
and  ,I,,  stands for tlie doinestic fiim's output for tlic foreigii market and so o11 
12. A final  good is  said  to be a  strategic  substitute  (strategic  complement) if a more 
aggressive strategy by a player, e.g. a higher quantity, decreases (increases) tlie oppo- nent's  rnargiiial  profitability.  More  foililally, we  cail  express the  strategic  substi- 
hitability aiid compleme~itarity  as tlie second order partial derivatives wiih respect to 
the  rival's  strategic variablc. For instaiice, for a foreigii finn in  tlie  doiilestic  tïiial 
a2nH  good market strategie substihltability can be written as -  <O . Alteinatively, 
+JHH&.FH 
a2nH  siippose we havc -  > O  we eiicouiitcr strategic 
a!xH  a~Ftf  coinpleinentarity. For thc 
Sorcigii finn in the domcstic market we write  *<o  for stnrlegic siibstitutes 
~!FH  JJRH 
and  *<o  for stratcgic compleiiiesits. The similm reasoniiig applies Sor  tlic 
~YFH   ai^,,, 
foreigii markct. 
13. Altlio~igli  soine authors have proven that 'perverse' price adjustineiit can occur under 
particular extreme set-ups, we wil1 neglect this possibility for tractability reasoiis. For 
sucli aiialysis see Hens ct al. (1991) aiid Kirnian aild Phlips (1996). 
14. Tlie alteinating firnls assuinption  is replaced by  a clustering of tlie  finns i11  recent 
research. See Aksoy aiid Lustig (1998). 
15. For the case of Beitrand competition in differentiated goods see Friberg (1997). 
16.  See for example Gilbeit ((1989), (1991)), Ainano aiid Van Norden (1998) and Cote 
(1987). Such examples of systematic deviations from the PPP likely suggest pricing- 
to-market even in these hoinogeiieous markets. 
17. See Athukorala and Menon (1994) and Campa aiid Goldberg (1995) ainoiig others. 
18. See Sor  exainple Spencer aiid Joiies ((1991). 11992)). 
19. Tliis view was subject to the studies of Baldwin aild Kruginan (19891, Dixit (1989) 
aiid Baldwiii and Lyoiis (1994). 
20.  Empirica1 tests of the liysteresis hypothesis are rather rare. See Robei-ts aiid Tybout 
(1998) for an applicatioii of the sunk cost idea to tlie Coloinbiaii fini1 level data. They 
fiiid film evidence of the relevaiice of sunk costs, in  order to explaiil hysteresis in 
trade voluines and prices. 
21.  Assusiie tliat the second order profit maximization condition is satisfied. 
22.  111  line with Cliamberlain's coilcl~~sioiis  aii increase in tlie varieties in ai1 industry cali 
be seen to shift deniaiid for each variety downwards inakiilg them more elastic. 
23.  Verify from (9) aiid (10). 
24.  In liile with tlic fiiidiiigs of Meese and Rogoff (1983). 
25.  Ansic aiid Pugh (1997) coiiducted an iiiterestiiig laboratory experirileiit on tlie inarket 
exit and entry decisioiis iii the presence of sunk costs aild excliange rate uiicei-tainty. 
Their fiiidings support the view that sunk costs play a crucial role i11 trade activity. 1t 
suggests that tlie band of inaction widens as tlie variance of excliange rate is high and 
sunk costs are sufliciciitly large. A recent study by Canipa (1998) argues that sunk 
costs were crucial in tlie eiitry-exit decisioiis of Spailish manufactilriiig exporters. He 
fiiids  that  excliange  ratc  uncertainty  does  not  play aii iiiiportant  role  in  eiitry-exit 
decisioiis. 
26.  For a coiitroversial result of tlic impact of excliange rate shocks on inarket shares, see 
Cabral aild Mello (1997). They fiiid that iii aii asymmetrie duopoly frainework, teiii- 
porary exchange rate shocks have a larger impact oii inarket shares tlian pennaiieiit 
excliaiige rate shocks. 
27.  See for instaiice, Delgado (1993) or Shesliinski and Weiss ((1983), (1993)). 
28.  Aiiother class of models applicd to closed ecoiloinies stipulate a set tinic period witli 
fïxed nomina1 prices-the contract period. The researchers then fociis on what deter- miiies the leiigtli of tlie pricing coiltract. tlie real price beliaviour ~vithiii  tliis coiitract 
period  aiid tlie exteiit to whicli filrther contracts are linked witli tlie  earlier olies. Iii 
this survey paper we cvill iieglcct tliis type of analysis since tliis did iiot tïiid ai1 appli- 
cation  area  in  tlie  inteiliational  context.  For  ai1  excellent  detailcd  aiialysis  of  SS 
ccoiiomics  consult Slieshiiislti aiid Wciss (1 993). For a geiieral equilibriuin pcrspec- 
tivc scc Daiiziger (1999). 
29.  Iii otlier words, tlie film's adjustinent  costs incrcase  as a fiiiictioii of tlie cliaiiges  iii 
the demand fi~nction.  This assiitnption staiids at odds witli thc standard fixed adjust- 
inent costs literature, wlicrc 11iciiu costs represeilt just thc adininistrative or executioii 
costs of cliaiiging tlie pricc. I11  particular, capturiiig  demaiid clcincnts  in tlie adjust- 
iiieiit cost functioii sliould cause soiiic strategic coniplications in his aiialysis. 
30.  Sce  Meiion  (1995)  wlio  conducted  aii  cxccllent  survey  coiiiprising  46  studies 
aiialysiiig cxchaiige rate pass-tl~ough.  In tlicsc 46 studies the followiilg coiiiitries are 
iested  for  tlie  excliaiige  rate  pass-through:  thc  US,  Japan,  Australia,  Gemaiiy, 
Canada, tlie UK, Korea, Fraiice, the Netlierlands, Bclgiuin. Ttaly. Taiwaii, Botswana, 
Papua  New  Guiiica,  Austria.  Deiiinark,  Fiiiland;  Norway,  Spaiii,  Swedeii, 
Switzerland, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. 
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